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Europe is approaching the point at which decisions have to be made about the 
construction of a monetary union in Europe. Once exchange rates are fixed real 
exchange rate adjustment will have to come through changes in relative prices, 
and as Europe appears to exhibit considerable nominal inertia this process can be 
expensive in terms of lost output. Hence it is important to make an assessment of 
each potential member’s sustainable real exchange rate before nominal rates are 
irrevocably fixed. This note sets out some estimates of such exchange rates, and 
suggests that many European economies are currently close to their sustainable 
exchange rates. However, the sustainable exchange rate is not immutably fixed. 
The Maastricht fiscal criteria are seen as central to the construction of a monetary 
union in Europe. Constraints on fiscal policy are seen as essential to the 
successful management of the union, as can be seen from the strength of the 
penalties set out in the stability pact. Some countries will have to make 
considerable moves to consolidate their public finances, and this will in turn 
change the real exchange rate that they can sustain.
This paper develops a theoretical model that allows us to lay some foundations 
for the evaluation of sustainable or equilibrium real exchange rates (EERs). We 
construct a model of a small open economy and analyse its properties. We 
attempt to reconcile stock and flow analysis in this framework, and in particular 
we look at the relationship between fiscal policy and the (equilibrium) real 
exchange rate, drawing on Barrell and Sefton (1997).
A Small Open Economy Model
We base our analysis on a data-based, extended version of the Mundell-Fleming 
model, drawing on Buiter and Miller (1981) and on the papers contained in Buiter 
(1990). The policy conclusions drawn from this model depend upon the 
characteristics of the world we are describing. In order to calibrate the 
magnitudes involved we use the estimated model NiGEM, rather than a purely 
theoretical construct, to undertake some policy analyses. The structure of NiGEM 
can be seen as the empirical equivalent of the extended Mundell Fleming model, 
and its properties closely reflect those of the theoretical model* 1. In this paper we 
wish to investigate the effects of fiscal policy on real exchange rates both in the
* We would like to thank Andy Blake and Garry Young of the Institute and Chris Allsop, 
Jianpiero Gali, Peter Sinclair and conference participants at the European University Institute 
for comments on a previous version of this paper.
1 In its normal mode of operation exchange rates and financial markets, for instance, are 



























































































short run and in the longer term. Many of these fiscal policy issues are discussed 
in Barrell and Sefton (1997), and we only summarise our results here. We choose 
to look at the effects of fiscal policy on sustainable exchange rates in a small 
country, as this helps give clarity to our conclusions.
In order that our theoretical model is general we will set it up with wealth effects 
and the possibility that we can introduce a weak form of Ricardian equivalence. 
We collapse the demand side of the world into one (IS style) relationship where
output, y, depends negatively on the real interest rate (r - p ) and positively on
the real exchange rate. We also include effects from net private sector financial 
wealth, z , government spending, g , and (potentially a negative effect from) 
government bonds, b , and we have utilised a log approximation to the linear 
wealth identity2i.e.
y = -y( r -p ) + 8(e-p ) + ez + g - q b (1)
We assume that increases in government spending, which raise current disposable 
income, will also raise consumption. We concentrate on the link between fiscal 
policy and the current account.
Our wage price system can be reduced to a relatively simple, sluggish adjustment 
price equation (2) where expected inflation, 7t is mediated by an effect from 
aggregate demand. We can write an aggregate augmented inflation equation.
p =\\iy + n (2)
We assume that the demand for money (3) depends upon income and the interest 
rate r, and rm is the rate of return on money, which we can assume to be zero.
m - p = ky - A,(r-rm) (3)
We also assume that the rate of growth of the stock of money is determined by its 
target growth rate (4)
m = k (4)
2,. For expositional clarity we have suppressed t in our analysis, and we have assumed that 
Z=2B, where B is the level of the bond stock and Z is the level of the wealth stock. In general 
our results depend upon private sector foreign assets always being positive, and hence 




























































































We need two asset markets in order to close our model. We have assumed for 
expositional simplicity that the private sector has a well defined wealth/income 
equilibrium, and that foreign assets and domestic government bonds are the only 
assets. Hence if the government issues bonds they will either be held by foreign 
residents or domestic residents will reduce their foreign assets, and hence the 
national net stock of foreign assets is3.
f = (2z- b ). (5)
We assume that the exchange rate follows the open arbitrage path with an asset 
related risk premium:-
e = ( r - r  ) + p(2z-b)  (6)
where 7 is the rate of interest on foreign assets. As e is the effective exchange 
rate, a rise in private sector foreign assets causes the exchange rate to appreciate, 
and a rise in the government debt stock causes an ongoing real depreciation 
through its effect on the risk premium. The accumulation of private sector assets 
(and hence the current account) can be written as:-
/  = ( r b r g b) f +  7 -ay + p ( e - p )  (7)
Where a superscript "b" denotes the base value for a variable, and ' 7 g is the 
nominal growth rate in the rest of the world. The base value has to be included 
because the introduction of wealth stocks imparts some degree of base 
dependency into the analysis of shocks such as a change in the world interest 
rate. The first two terms of the RHS of (7) represent the effects of debt service or 
debt interest receipts on the current account. We also assume that demand will 
worsen the current account and that an appreciation of the real exchange rate (as 
defined here) will improve the current account.
If there were no government spending and no government debt stock we would 
have three state variables in our system. However, we wish to analyse the effects 
of fiscal policy, and hence we have to write down the private sector asset 
accumulation equation (as distinct from the foreign assets accumulation equation), 
where B is the long run government to bond stock ratio on the base.
3 If F=Z-B then log(F) can be approximated by f=l/(l-t)*z - t/(l-t)*b where t=B/Z on the base 




























































































z = (rb 'rgb) z+( r -  p ) + g / B (8 )
where the superscript "b" once again denotes the value of the base trajectory, and 
rg is the nominal rate of growth of income in the domestic economy. The debt 
accumulation equation consists of interest payments on debt, and the primary 
deficit (net of any high powered money issue), g, divided by the long run bond 
stock.
In order that the government debt stock does not rise without bounds we also 
introduce a feedback rule for government spending.
g = X(b - b t ) (9)
Where bt is the target debt stock. In a dynamically efficient economy a 
permanently sustained positive value for g will cause the debt stock to explode, 
and hence the intertemporal budget constraint is violated. This feedback rule 
allows us to prevent this happening if we wish.
If we had no government we could put (2) and (4) together in order to write an 
expression for / = m- p , (5) and (2) together to write an expression for c - e - p  , 
and (6) would be sufficient for the current account. However; the existence of b 
and g changes our set of state variables. We have to write:-
/ =m- p = - \|/y (10a)
c = e- p = ( r - r  ) + p(z - b ) - V|/y -ti (10b)
/  = z-6 = (rb+rgb) f + ( r -  p ) -ay + (3(e - p ) (10c)
Where / i s  the current account, which is the sum of private and public sector 
accumulations of foreign assets. We also have to take account of (8) and (9) and 
hence we have a four equation dynamic system to solve. In Barrell and Sefton 
(1997) we analyse this system and demonstrate that the following conditions must 
hold if the system is to embody a well-defined solution;
• (k -X,V|/) > 0 which is the Cagan condition on the slope of the LM curve,
• (p -5a) > 0 which is the extended Marshall Lemer condition
• [p(e+p.(B+y)) - 5( 7 b- 7 gb)] > 0 which is a wealth equilibrium condition4,




























































































• X > ('> ~rgh)< which is a debt stability condition,
The third condition requires that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth must be sufficiently high that the accumulation of interest receipts from 
existing holdings of wealth does not cause the wealth stock to grow without 
bound (a "no misers" condition). The last condition is required for the stability of 
the debt process itself, requiring the feedback to exceed the excess of the interest 
rate over the growth rate. In a dynamically efficient economy the feedback must 
be positive. Hence we can claim that a necessary condition for saddlepath 
stability in an extended Mundell Fleming model with a debt issuing government is 
the imposition of an adequate solvency constraint (g = x(b - bt)) on the primary 
budget deficit.
As our intention is to analyse the long run of the system, we can set >°° and 
inspect the long run results system5. In this paper we are particularly interested in 
the effect of bt, the debt target on the real exchange rate, c, and the derivative can 
be written as (See Barrell and Sefton 1997):
d c  ( f - r g p < i - ( r ' ’ - r g b)B-T\) 
dbt  p(e + p ( B + y ) ) - 8 ( f - r g  )
The derivative of competitiveness with respect to the target is clearly positive, 
and hence in the long run a change in the debt target causes c to rise, and hence a 
higher debt stock causes the economy to have to be more competitive. In other 
words, in the long run a higher debt stock requires a lower relative price level.
It is useful to check that our system is stable, and then look at the dynamics of 
adjustment in a simple model of the economy. We have chosen a simple model 
with little Ricardian equivalence that is calibrated of the NIESR model of the UK 
economy. Chart one plots the evolution of the bond stock b, the stock of private 
sector assets z, and the real exchange rate, c, in response to an increase in bt. As 
we have wound the solvency constraint up very tight for illustrative purposes the 
actual bond stock quickly achieves its target. The stock of private sector assets 
initially rises, and then falls back almost to base, as we have assumed Ricardian 
effects are weak. The real exchange rate initially jumps down (appreciates) and 
then rises along the arbitrage path. It rises above base in the long run (has
5 In the long nan the debt stock will not quite equal the target debt stock with our feedback 
rule. There will be a small offset that is a complicated function of the variables and parameters 
of the model. As X~*°° the size of the offset tends to zero, and hence this assumption allows us 




























































































depreciated) in order that the primary current (or trade) account surplus is large 
enough to ensure that interest on the extra external debt can be paid. In this case 
(almost) all the new debt issued is held abroad. The stronger is Ricardian 
equivalence, the less the effect on the exchange rate, and the less the effect on the 
stock of debt held abroad.
A permanent Increate In the government debt stock
Our simple model can be seen as the theoretical basis for the existence of an 
equilibrium real exchange rate that depends on the wealth equilibrium of the 
private sector, the size of the government bond stock and on the competitiveness 
elasticity summarised in the current account equation, as well as the absorption 
effect from the simple IS curve. The economy is at its equilibrium real exchange 
rate when output and inflation are on their long ran trajectories (which may be 
described as internal balance), and when the current account (or external balance) 
is consistent with the government debt stock and the wealth stock equilibrium 
embedded in the economy, which is determined by the parameters of the IS 
curve. Hence, if we wish to evaluate real exchange rate equilibrium in an 
economy we have to estimate internal balance and external balance relationships, 
and we turn to this below.
The Evaluation o f Equilibrium Exchange Rates
We are particularly interested in equilibrium exchange rates in Europe, as the 
identification of real exchange rates, or relative price indicators is central to the 
evaluation of the short run costs of setting up a monetary union in Europe. In 




























































































model of the European economies. In particular we have to evaluate what real 
alternative real exchange rate trajectories would have been sustainable. We need 
to analyse the long run structure of a model similar to our theoretical construct. In 
Barrell and Wren Lewis (1989) and Barrell and in’t Veld (1991) we used a large 
econometric model of the advanced economies to evaluate the trajectory for the 
Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER or in IMF parlance, the DEER). 
These analyses were designed for a series of exercises undertaken for Williamson 
(1994).
We do not use the concept of Purchasing Power Parity for several reasons, 
although it is not necessarily inconsistent with the concept of the EER. If supply 
and demand elasticities in international trade are (in the long run) sufficiently 
large then the economy will be attracted to a relative price level that is justified 
by PPP. However, the long run may be rather longer than we feel is useful for 
policy analysis, because it may have to involve the relocation of economic 
activity. A common approach is to demonstrate that prices and the exchange rate 
cointegrate, but this cannot be interpreted as evidence in favour of PPP. The 
existence of an equilibrium real exchange rate should not be doubted, but all we 
may conclude from cointegration results is that it may be above or below PPP.
Empirical work on trade volumes and prices tends to find that competitiveness 
elasticities are not great. However, equilibration does not only come about by the 
adjustment of trade volumes. PPP may be brought about by the relocation of 
economic activity. Barrell and Pain (1996) do find some evidence that relative 
costs affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, although such effects are small 
and slow acting. It is clear that many countries can affect their current real 
exchange rate for some periods of time, even if there are strong forces driving the 
real exchange rate back to equilibrium. The manipulation of the real exchange 
rate can be, and has been, used as a tool for increasing exports and accumulation.
In order to evaluate the EER we require a set of empirical relationships 
determining internal balance, external balance and asset accumulation These can 
be constructed from our model. The external balance relationship is equivalent 
to our overseas asset accumulation condition above and we require trade volume 
and price equations:
XVOL = f(World Demand, Relative Prices )
MVOL = g(Domestic Demand, Relative Prices )




























































































PM = k(Domestic Prices, World Prices )
CB = CB(Relative prices, World Demand, Capacity Utilisation, World 
Prices)
For given levels of world and domestic demand along with World Prices for 
commodities such as oil, the real exchange rate, as described by relative prices, 
will deliver a current account balance. The factors involved in the internal 
balance relationship will vary depending on the structure of the economy and the 
factors involved in the wage bargaining relationship. We require wage, price and 
demand relationships:
PD = fi (Domestic Costs, Capacity Utilisation, )
WC = gi (Domestic Prices, Real Exchange Rate, Unemployment, )
DD = h, (Domestic Incomes, Asset Stocks, )
IB = IB(Real Exchange Rate, Capacity Utilisation, Domestic Incomes,
Asset Stocks)
These are described by our IS, inflation and labour market relations and labour 
markets discussed above. In early analyses of EERs it was assumed that the wage 
bargain displayed a real exchange rate wedge, and hence internal balance was a 
function of the real exchange rate. However, as Barrell (1993) argues, the 
empirical and theoretical support for this proposition is weak. The level of 
domestic capacity affects wages through unemployment, and prices through 
capacity utilisation. If capacity increases then domestic wages and prices would 
have to be lower than they would otherwise have been. However, if the economy 
is operating at full capacity then there may be no domestic forces putting pressure 
on the real exchange rate. If the economy is operating at capacity, world output is 
on its underlying trend, and world prices are on a stable trajectory then we should 
have external and internal balance
However, for the EER to be sustainable, or on a sustainable trajectory, as we 
argue above, we require that the economy is at an asset equilibrium. This will 
depend, inter alia, on the size of the government debt stock, and the level of 
overseas assets. It will also depend on the time profile of domestic income and 
spending, with countries having long term accumulation needs running balance of 
payments surpluses. Unless trade elasticities are extremely large this requires that 




























































































of government debt stock projections, along with our evaluation of demographic 
developments, influence our model based forecast of the world economy.
As the concept of the EER is a medium term one we can abstract from the effects 
of short run dynamics. Hence, in solving the system above we can find the long 
run structure of our model and invert it to solve for the real exchange rate 
consistent with the trajectory for the current account that we have chosen. Our 
theoretical model above allows us to say that there should be a clear relationship 
between the real exchange rate and the current account, but that only one current 
account (and government debt stock trajectory) is associated with each real 
exchange rate in the long run. If we take the asset accumulation, internal and 
external balance relationships, we can utilise them to write an expression for the 
EER Real Exchange Rate




























































































France, Actual and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates
Internal Balance IB = IB(Real Exchange Rate, Capacity Utilisation, Domestic
Incomes, Asset Stocks)
External Balance CB= CB(Real Exchange Rate, World Demand, Capacity
Utilisation, world Prices)
Asset Accumulation Equilibrium AAE
At the EER capacity is fully utilised, and hence we can omit this term, and 
domestic incomes and world demand are on trend. Hence we write the EER as:




























































































Germany, Actual and Equilibrium Real Exchange Ratea
Italy, Actual and Equilibrium Real Exchange Ratea
Our French and German asset equilibria both change around the time of German 
unification, as do our other European targets, because German outflows were 
diverted, and this has to be matched elsewhere. We have a trending asset 
equilibria for the UK and for Italy to reflect the structural improvements in the 
underlying budgetary position that we believe were in place.
The charts plot our EERs estimates for the major European. These estimates are 
for effective exchange rates, and Table One gives details of our bilateral US 




























































































• The ECU basket appears to be just around correct, but this masks internal 
structural problems, with some countries being overvalued, and others 
undervalued.
• The DM was overvalued during the early 1990s, but relatively low inflation 
removed much of this. Our work in Barrell and in’t Veld (1991) suggested that 
prior to unification the DM had been undervalued relative to the EER, and we 
would make the same judgement now.
• The French Franc has also been overvalued for much of the 1990s, although by 
the end of our data period the overvaluation was probably no more than five 
percent. This estimate depends upon our estimate of internal balance, and we 
calculate that equilibrium unemployment in France is around 8%. If the 
equilibrium, or sustainable unemployment level were 10% then the Franc 
would be around its equilibrium.
• The UK was overvalued whilst it was in the ERM, but the subsequent 
devaluation probably took it below the EER. We have assumed that the trend 
budget deficit improved by around half a percent of GDP after 1993.
• A similar story can be told for the lire, but the undervaluation at the end of 
1995 was significantly greater. We have assumed that the government 
structural (or trend) budget deficit improved by almost a percent of GDP a year 
from 1990 onwards.
Table One. Actual and target exchange rates in the fourth quarter of 1996 (US 




































































































In this paper we have shown that in a small open economy model there is a 
connection between the target government debt stock and the equilibrium real 
exchange rate. A change in the target changes the equilibrium real exchange rate 
(unless there is full Ricardian equivalence). This is significant in the discussions 
of monetary union in Europe, as the criteria for membership of the union require 
significant changes in fiscal policy in a number of countries. Hence, if in late 
1996 exchange rates were close to their equilibrium given current debt stocks and 
private sector behaviour, those equilbria will change as debt stocks fall to below 
60 percent of GDP. Countries with large debt stocks, such as Italy and Belgium, 
will require large increases in their real exchange rates as they approach their 
fiscal targets.
Once monetary union is formed (or rather once nominal exchange rates are 
proximately fixed) real exchange rates have to adjust through the movement of 
relative prices. Our simple calibrated model suggests that for each one percent of 
GDP change in the debt stock target the real exchange rate has to change by 0.1 
percent. A fall of ten percent in the debt stock target would therefore require a 
fall in the real exchange rate (an appreciation) of around one percent. Hence if 
Italy, say, which is well represented by our calibrated model, is to cut its debt 
stock from 120 percent of GDP to 40 percent of GDP its real (equilibrium) 
exchange rate will have to rise by 8 percent, and hence its inflation rate must 
exceed that of the rest of Europe by one percent for eight years. Given other 
structural adjustments in the economy this could make the inflation differential 
exceed 1.5 percent, and hence the attempt to achieve the Maastricht targets of a 
fixed nominal rate and an acceptable debt stock may well cause such an economy 
to be excluded from monetary union because it fails the inflation criteria.
Ray Barrell and James Sefton
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
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